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Value Relevance of Earnings of Multinational Firms: Regulatory Regimes Associated with 
Foreign Subsidiaries 
 
Abstract 
We examine market valuation of foreign earnings of US multinational firms in the context of 
strength of rule of law of countries in which the international subsidiaries are located. Using 
12,288 firm-years observations for the period of 1996 to 2013, we find that foreign earnings 
association with returns are increasing with the average rule of law of countries in which the 
MNCs have subsidiaries. We find negative returns-foreign earnings association when a firms 
expand its operations to other countries, but such association turns out positive when the 
expansion occurs to countries with stronger investor protection. Value relevance of foreign 
earnings is highest for the firms which have international subsidiaries located to destinations that 
are strong in rule of law but are not characterized as tax haven. Our results are robust to 
alternative empirical specifications and to the concern of endogenous relationship between 
market valuation and multinational choice of foreign location.  
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Value Relevance of Earnings of Multinational Firms: Regulatory Regimes Associated with 
Foreign Subsidiaries 
1. Introduction 
 A part of prior body of research devoted to value relevance of foreign operations 
identifies that there is a significant positive association between stock returns and foreign 
earnings, or that the earnings generated from foreign operations are value relevant (e.g., Bodnar 
and Weintrop, 1997; Bodnar et al., 2003). Contrary to these findings, some papers show 
negligible or value reducing effects of foreign operations on firm value (e.g., Boatsman et al., 
1993; Denis et al., 2002; Garrod and Rees, 1998). However, there is little evidence on how 
different characteristics associated with different location of subsidiaries within a multinational 
firm might affect value relevance of earnings. In this paper, we address this issue by empirically 
examining the likely influence of location of foreign subsidiaries on returns-earnings association 
of multinationals.  
 Prior studies on this issue are mainly focused on how country specific factors of the firms 
in different countries affect value relevance of accounting information. Characteristics such as 
requirements of financial reporting, practices of disclosures, corporate governance, and strength 
of investor protection in a country are found to be very important country factors that could 
determine the nature and strength of value relevance of the firms (e.g., Ali and Hwang, 2000; 
Hung, 2001). None of these studies focuses on the effect of within firm locations of subsidiaries 
on value relevance of accounting information.  
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 Studies that take into the account the issue of characteristics associated with different 
locations of foreign subsidiaries are found to be focused on the research questions other than 
value relevance, such as financial reporting practices. Empirical results of this line of research 
show that MNCs that have subsidiaries with extensive operations in countries with weaker state 
of investor protection tend to manage earnings more (Beuselinck et al., 2016; Durnec et al., 
2014; Dyreng et al., 2012). If earnings management could diminish the value relevance of 
earnings, as empirically shown by Marquardt and Wieldman (2004), then we can predict that 
MNCs with highly concentrated operations in weak protection regimes would show lower value 
relevance of accounting information than MNCs which have subsidiaries concentrated in 
countries with strong investor protection.  
 We find that value relevance of foreign earnings of U.S. multinational corporations 
(MNCs) are positivity associated with the average rule of law of countries in which the MNCs 
have material operations. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that geographic expansion 
of MNCs reduce their value relevance of accounting information, but expanding into strong rule 
of law countries actually help them gain high value relevance. Furthermore, our results indicate 
that value relevance of foreign earnings is highest when MNCs operate in countries that have 
strong rule of law but are not regarded as tax haven destinations. Our results are robust to 
alternative explanations and specifications controlling for important factors and endogeneity in 
the relationship between market returns and location choice of subsidiaries.  
 Our paper contributes to both literature of value relevance and valuation effect of 
international diversification. Even though there is a large body of literature focused on valuation 
effect of multinational activities, we do not have enough evidence, if any, of how regulatory 
strength associated with subsidiary destinations of foreign MNCs affect the value relevance of 
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their accounting information. Also as prior literature on value relevance of foreign earnings show 
differential impact of foreign operational growth and performance on valuation, we show that 
regulatory environment surrounding the foreign operations play significant role in the evaluation 
of foreign performance.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss on related literature 
and hypotheses development. We discuss on the part of data and methodology in section 3 and 
discuss on empirical findings in section 4. Section 5 discusses results from robustness checks. 
We conclude in section 6.  
 
2. Related literature and hypotheses development 
2.1. Theories and evidence of valuation effect of multinational activities 
 Economic benefits of international diversification could be derived from economies of 
scale, access to larger pool of customer, access to the use of natural resources, greater flexibility 
in operational activities, and opportunities of profiting from differences in institutional 
regulations. As international diversification facilitate investors to claim on a portfolio of 
diversified profit streams sourced from different parts of the world, we can expect of a premium 
for foreign operations while assessing the market value of a multinational corporation. However, 
findings from empirical studies provide conflicting evidence on the relationship between market 
value and foreign operations of the firms. The theoretical argument that firm value is increasing 
with international diversification (Caves, 1971; Kogut, 1983; Errunza and Senbet, 1981; Hines 
and Rice, 1994) has gained much of its empirical support from earlier work. For example, 
examining foreign sales or number of foreign subsidiaries as the measures of the extent of 
`6 
 
international operations during the period of 1970-78, Errunza and Senbet (1984) find a positive 
relationship between the firm value and foreign activity. Later Morch and Yeung (1991) find that 
the positive impact of R&D and advertising expenditure on the firm value is increasing with 
multinational activities, but multinationality per se does not show any significant impact. Their 
findings support the internalization theory that the greater capacity of the use of intangible assets 
make it beneficiary for a firm‟s entry into foreign market (e.g. Coase, 1937; Hennart, 1982; 
Rugman, 1981).  
 Boatsman et al. (1993), in one of the notable studies which provide evidence of negative 
or insignificant relationship between the firm value and multinational activities, examine how 
market reacts to the information of unexpected profits generated by foreign segments. They find 
that the observed association depends on the magnitude of foreign earnings surprise, the time 
periods and the selection of the region, and draw the conclusion that the disclosure of foreign 
earnings does not have any considerable influence on equity values. Christophe and Pfeiffer 
(2000) document that the market valuation of foreign operations is not as high as the valuation of 
domestic operations. Focusing on the time period of 1987-1993, Denis et al. (2002) examine the 
performance of globally diversified firms relative to the performance of singe-segment domestic 
firms. While industrially diversified firms are associated with valuation discount as the findings 
of the prior literature suggests, they consider both global and industrial diversification into their 
empirical tests and find that globally diversified firms, on average, exhibit a valuation discount 
that is similar in magnitude to the discount documented for industrially diversified firms.  
 
2.2. Information environment of multinational firms 
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 Literature that empirically examine the relationship between a firm‟s level of 
internationalization and information transparency produces evidence that are not very conducive 
in making of any strong inference. Because of operations in different geographical areas, MNCs 
face an exposure to multitude of economic, legal, cultural and political environments. Therefore, 
variations in growth opportunities and risk structure of MNCs tend to be much larger than that 
are in domestic firms. Such exposure to wider spectrum of financial and nonfinancial 
environment immediately invokes some information asymmetries inherent in the operations of 
MNCs that are very unusual to be present in their domestic counterparts. Evidence of prior works 
confirm this notion that information asymmetry is very severe in the case of MNCs (e.g., Callen 
et al., 2005; Duru and Reeb, 2002; Hope and Thomas, 2008; Hope et al., 2009). Moreover, 
foreign earnings show higher persistence than domestic earnings (Bodnar and Weintrop, 1997; 
Thomas, 1999), which might indicate poor disclosure practices associated with foreign 
operations (White et al., 2003). The empirical work of Aabo et al. (2015) find evidence of 
positive relationship between the degree of foreign operations of U.S. MNCs and information 
asymmetry. That is, their results suggest that an increase in the extent of a firm‟s foreign 
involvement tend to diminish the quality of analyst forecast, information content of stock price 
and idiosyncratic volatility. The negative effect of international operations on information 
environment predominantly exist for the MNCs that operate in countries that are culturally 
unique compared to U.S.   
 
2.3. Value relevance of foreign earnings relative to domestic earnings 
 Following several economic arguments, as discussed in Bodnar et al. (2003), we can 
expect to observe considerable differences between the vale relevance of foreign and domestic 
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earnings. First, as international operations are often associated with more uncertainty in 
generating earnings flow, market might put less value for foreign earnings than domestic 
earnings. Uncertainty in foreign income might arise from exposure to more risk factors, such as, 
exchange rate volatility, political uncertainty, and agency problems associated with 
internationalization, geographic and cultural distances, legal complexities and constraints from 
operating of foreign subsidiaries in different legal regimes (Burgman, 1996; He and Ng, 1998; 
Lee and Kwok, 1988; Reeb et al., 1998). Such greater risk and uncertainty might the investors in 
demanding of higher rate of return from foreign operations. This would turn into the expectation 
of higher discount rate for foreign income than domestic income and the resulted lower 
association between stock returns and foreign income changes.  
 Second, on the other hand, we could consider reasons that support the view that value 
relevance of foreign income would be larger than domestic income. For example, even though in 
the presence of more volatility, changes in exchange rate might bring persistence in foreign 
income changes, as exchange rate changes tend to be characterized as highly persistent (e.g., 
Messe and Rogoff, 1983; Frankel and Rose, 1995). Therefore, foreign earning as more persistent 
than domestic earnings because of the influence of exchange rate, we can expect a greater effect 
on value for a change in foreign earnings than a similar change in domestic earnings. Another 
argument, as Bodnar et al. (2003) highlights, MNCs might employ conservatism in accounting 
choices for newly opened foreign segments. Because a segment could be associated with greater 
level of uncertainty at initial cycle of operations, it could be the firms themselves or the auditors 
might demand conservative reporting of revenues and expenditure until the segment shows 
promising sign of success. In this case, in the presence of conservative accounting for newly 
established foreign operations, we can expect a larger valuation impact for foreign earnings.  
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 Another reason that might cause foreign earnings to experience larger effect in valuation 
is growth opportunities associated with foreign operations that are not likely to be different from 
opportunities associated with domestic operations. As firms tend to expand their operations into 
relatively newer and underexploited foreign locations (e.g., Kogut, 1983), and as the success in 
domestic operations might set the firms to explore foreign markets and the eventual experience 
of greater growth opportunities associated with successful foreign operations, one can expect 
growth opportunities of foreign operations to be higher than domestic operations. Collins and 
Kothari (1989) argue that association of earnings with stock prices is increasing with growth 
opportunities. Because of higher growth opportunities, foreign earnings might receive higher 
valuation from the market.  
 Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) argue that market values of foreign versus domestic 
operations should be significantly different and provide evidence with important indications for 
why investors might place higher values for international operations of MNCs compared to 
values associated with domestic operations. Essentially, focusing on U.S. multinational firms, 
they decompose earnings into foreign and domestic components and find that both changes in 
foreign and changes in domestic earnings are positively associated with stock prices. More 
importantly, the results show that the association of foreign earnings are significantly higher than 
domestic earnings. The results imply, as authors argue, growth opportunities associated with 
foreign operations might be more valuable than domestic operations. Earnings growth from 
foreign operations indicate that MNCs are successful in expanding their operations into foreign 
locations and are operating under the scenario of higher likelihood of generating more earnings 
and cash flows in the future. In another study, Bodnar, Hwang, and Weintrop (2003) investigate 
whether value relevance of foreign incomes of MNCs in other countries are as high as shown by 
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U.S. multinationals in the study of Bodnar and Weintrop (1997). Focusing on MNCs of 
Australia, Canada, and U.K., evidence from their empirical tests suggest that, similar to U.S., 
disclosures of foreign income are value-relevant and the association of foreign income with stock 
returns are higher than the association of domestic income. Further evidence confirms that such 
differences in association are mainly due to the differences in growth opportunities of foreign 
operations relative to domestic operations.   
 In another investigation, Garrod and Rees (1998) extend the Ohlson (1995) valuation 
model by using foreign segment data and examine the earnings and book values of U.K. based 
multinational firms. They find higher valuation of multinational firms than valuation of domestic 
firms. They do not find any evidence of significant premium for the foreign operations, however, 
the results show that operations in U.S. receive higher valuation than operations in other 
locations.  
 
2.4. Country specific characteristics and value relevance of MNCs 
 Alford et al. (1993) find evidence that information content of earnings are not 
homogeneous across different countries. Their investigation confirms that such observes 
differences are due to the differences in capital markets such as disclosure practices, 
requirements of financial reporting and corporate governance. Ali and Hwang (2000) conduct a 
comprehensive study to examine whether value relevance of accounting information differ 
across seventeen countries due to country specific factors. They identify lower value relevance 
for the countries with bank-oriented financial systems because of low requirement for value 
relevant information in financial reports, and also they identify that value relevance is lower for 
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the countries where private sectors have no involvement in the process of standard setting, as 
government standard setters are likely to be motivated by political agenda. Furthermore, 
countries with continental model, countries with higher influence of tax rules in determining of 
measurements of financial accounting, and countries with practices of little expenditure for 
external auditing services are likely to be associated with lower value relevance of accounting 
information. Another important country-specific characteristic found by Ball et al. (2000) is 
timely disclosure of earnings, which is more pronounced in common law countries than in code 
law countries, as timely disclosures are highly demanded in regions with common law. Hung 
(2001) find that countries with weak shareholder protection are tend to experience negative 
effects of the use of accrual accounting on value relevance of financial statement. DeFond et al. 
(2007) also identify strong investor protection in a country as an important determinant of 
informativeness of earnings announcements.  
 Organizational complexity surrounding the financial and nonfinancial environment of 
international operations could provide MNCs greater scope of producing poor financial reports. 
Leuz et al. (2003), by examining earnings management of a sample of firms from 31 countries, 
find evidence of the influence of institutional settings of a country on the practices of financial 
reporting. They argue that the presence of strong investor protection law in a country would 
make it difficult for the firms to extract private benefits by manipulating information. 
Confirming their argument, they find that firms located in countries with poor status of investor 
protection are more likely to manage earnings.  
 
2.5. Location of foreign subsidiaries and disclosure practices 
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 One of the few studies that investigates reporting practices within a multination company 
is Dyreng et al. (2012), where they examine earnings management of U.S. multinational firms. 
Investigating earnings management separately for foreign earnings and domestic earnings, they 
find that foreign earnings management is more prevalent for the MNCs which have extensive 
operations in countries with weak investment protection law than MNCs with subsidiaries in 
countries with strong rule of law. Furthermore, their results show that profitable firms with 
subsidiaries concentrated in tax haven destinations manager earnings more, which is 
predominantly attributed to foreign earnings.  
 Durnev et al. (2014) investigate how operations of subsidiaries in Offshore Financial 
Centers (OFC) influences earnings management. Identifying “offshore firms” as the companies 
that are incorporated in OFCs and the companies that are U.S. domiciled but have subsidiaries or 
affiliates in OFCs, they find that the incidences earnings management are more prevalent in 
“offshore firms” than that are for the U.S. firms with no offshore subsidiaries. Especially 
subsidiaries in region with prevalent offshore characteristics are strongly associated with the 
firms‟ extensive practices of earnings management through both real activities and accruals. 
Using a large sample of MNCs with information of subsidiaries across 89 countries, Beuselinck 
et al. (2016) conduct an extensive study to figure out the location of earnings management within 
the MNC. As prior literature identifies the considerable influence of MNC headquarters in 
shaping of subsidiary-level decision related to investment and financing policies (Barlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989; Robinson and Stocken, 2014), they argue that MNCs might have propensity to 
use subsidiaries in order to meet their objective of consolidated reporting. They find that MNCs 
headquartered in stricter regulatory regime tend to manage earnings through subsidiaries in 
countries with weaker state of regulation. 
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2.6. Hypotheses development 
 As literature identifies foreign operations as having negligible impact on firm value (e.g., 
Boatsman et al., 1993; Christophe and Pfeiffer, 2000) or as having value reducing effect (e.g., 
Denis et al., 2002), our first concern is to examine value relevance of the effect of extent of 
foreign operations measured by number of different countries of operations of a firm. In par of 
doing that, based on the argument that growth opportunities associated with foreign operations 
are higher that of associated with domestic operations (Bodnar and Weintrop, 1997; Bodnar et 
al., 2003), we hypothesize that – 
H1: Value relevance of MNCs are increasing with the number of different countries of 
operations.  
 From our discussion above in literature review, it becomes evident that country specific 
factors such as strength of investor protection, corporate governance, requirements of financial 
reporting influence disclosure practices of the firms (Alford et al., 1993; Ali and Hwang, 2000; 
DeFond et al., 2007; Hung, 2001; Leuz et al., 2003). Moreover, studies show prevalence of 
earnings management for MNCs with high concentration of subsidiaries in countries with weak 
investor protection, or in tax haven countries, or in countries characterized as Offshore Financial 
Centers is associated with higher likelihood of earnings management (Dyreng et al., 2012; 
Durnev et al., 2014). On the other hand, as Marquardt and Wieldman (2004) show that earnings 
management diminishes the value relevance of accounting information, our two main hypotheses 
are - 
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H2: The returns-earnings association is lower for MNCs that have international subsidiaries 
with extensive operations in countries with low investor protection law. 
H3: High concentration of foreign subsidiaries in tax haven countries lower the value relevance 
of foreign earnings. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Measures of earnings and returns 
 We use Compustat Annual database to compute the measures of earnings. We define 
foreign earnings as the difference between pretax foreign income and foreign taxes, where 
foreign taxes are the sum of foreign income taxes and deferred foreign taxes. We calculate 
domestic earnings as the difference between pretax domestic income and domestic taxes, where 
domestic taxes are the total incomes taxes adjusted for foreign taxes. Then we compute earnings 
changes as the difference between the earnings of current fiscal year and of previous fiscal year 
which is then scaled by beginning of current year stock price.  
 We collect stock returns data from CRSP monthly returns file. To calculate returns, we 
cumulate the monthly market-adjusted returns from the fourth month of the current fiscal year to 
the third month following the end of fiscal year. We use returns on the CRSP value weighted 
index to measure market returns.  
3.2. Subsidiary information and measures of country-level regulation  
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 Information on subsidiaries are available in Exhibit 21 of the Form 10-K, where SEC 
require the firms to provide list of their material subsidiaries. We use subsidiary data provided by 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), where they create a database by extracting the information of the 
locations of subsidiaries and made their work available for public.
1
Using subsidiary information, 
we create a variable NCOUNTRIES as the total number distinct countries in which a firm-year 
has subsidiaries. 
 Our main variable of interest capturing the strength of regulation of a country is the 
RULE OF LAW, which is the average rule of law of countries in which the firm have subsidiaries 
as the Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K indicates. World Bank Governance Indicators dataset provide the 
scores of the rule of law, which ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher value indicating of stronger 
state of protection of investors. Essentially the scores of rule of law of a country captures the 
perception about to what extent the agents rely on and play by the rules of society, which 
specifically indicates the quality of contract enforcement and the quality of law enforcing 
agencies, and provides some notion about the likelihood of crime and violence. The RULE OF 
LAW that we use in our empirical analysis is the measure of rule of law at firm-level and 
provides information about the strength of local rule of law to which the international 
subsidiaries are exposed. A firm‟s high predominant presence of material subsidiaries in 
countries with strong rule of law would result in high value of RULE OF LAW. Further for 
empirical analysis, we construct quintile ranking RULEQ using the score of RULE OF LAW for 
each industry for each year. Then based on RULEQ, we create a dummy variable HIGH RULEQ 
that is equal to one if the values of quintile ranking for a firm-year falls above the median. We 
presume that the weak local systems of regulations associated with location of subsidiaries 
                                                     
1
 We are thankful to Scott Dyreng for making this data available at https://sites.google.com/site/scottdyreng/.  
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would provide greater opportunity of earnings manipulation, even though worldwide earnings of 
U.S.-based firms are exposed to U.S. GAAP and U.S. securities laws.  
 Our second measure of country-level regulation, which we use in our robustness tests, is 
HAVEN INTENSITY as a measure of proportion of subsidiaries being located in the tax haven 
countries. Using the lists of tax haven countries as described in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), we 
compute HAVEN INTENSITY as the number of subsidiaries in tax haven countries divided by the 
total number of subsidiaries. Similar to RULEQ, we also make a quintile ranking of HAVEN 
INTENSITY for each industry for each year as HAVENQ. Then we create a dummy variable as 
HIGH HAVENQ that is equal to one if quintile ranking of a firm-year is above median.   
 
3.3. Sample and descriptive statistics 
 Our sample period spans from the year of 1996 to 2013. Initially we construct a sample 
of U.S.-based multinational firms listed on Compustat, whereas multinationals are the firms 
which have nonzero values for pre-tax income or nonzero values for foreign tax expense. The 
multinationals in our sample have available information on full list of subsidiary locations 
worldwide. We exclude observations of firm-years in regulated industries (SIC codes 4900-4999 
and 6000-6999). Further we need the firm-years in our sample to have nonmissing information 
on both current and lagged observations for domestic and foreign earnings. The included sample 
have enough observations to calculate cumulative market-adjusted returns from CRSP. Finally, 
firm-years with missing information on country-level regulation for one or more countries in 
which the subsidiaries are located are excluded. Our final sample consists of 12,288 firm-years 
with 165,140 subsidiary-years observations.  
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4. Empirical specifications and results 
 In this section, we describe our empirical strategy of investigating the issue that to what 
extent the strength of association of accounting information with market returns vary with the 
firms‟ exposure to different levels of rules of law associated with subsidiaries in different 
countries. Essentially our tests are focus on whether the foreign earnings coefficient (ERC) is an 
increasing function of the strength of rule of law the international subsidiaries are exposed to. 
We particularly follow Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) and other recent studies which deal with the 
issue of value relevance of foreign earnings or foreign operations (e.g., Christophe, 2002; Hope 
and Thomas, 2008; Hope, Thomas, and Vasvari, 2009), we first use the following the model to 
ERC differentials between changes in domestic and foreign earnings – 
                                                          (1)                
where  is the monthly market-adjusted returns from the fourth month of current fiscal year to 
the third month after the end of fiscal year,  is change in domestic earnings per share 
deflated by beginning of period price,  is change in foreign earnings per share deflated 
by beginning of period stock price,  is dummy variable for each of the 44 industry groups 
which are defined using Fama-French 48 industry classification,  is dummy variable for 
each of the years from 1996 to 2013.  
 The results using the specification (1) is shown in the column (1) of table 5. Confirming 
the findings of prior studies (e.g., Bodnar and Weintrop, 1997; Bodnar, Hwang, and Weintrop, 
2003; Hope et al., 2009), we find that coefficients of both  and  are positively 
significant and more importantly the coefficient of foreign earnings changes is higher than 
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domestic earnings change. As the results confirm that foreign earnings are more value relevant 
than domestic earnings, we then investigate whether such positive association of foreign earnings 
are increasing with the average rule of law of countries in which the subsidiaries are located.  For 
this purpose, as discussed above, first we compute RULE OF LAW as the average score of rule of 
law of countries in which the subsidiaries of firm are located. Then we construct RULEQ as the 
quintile ranking of RULE OF LAW for each industry for each year. After introducing the RULEQ 
and an interaction term between RULEQ and  in column (2) of table 5, we find the 
association between returns and  positive but not significant. On the other hand, the 
interaction term between  and RULEQ shows a positive and very significant association 
with returns. The implication of the result is twofold. First and foremost, the value relevance of 
foreign earnings increases with average rule of law of countries in which the subsidiaries of the 
firms are located. Further it implies that investors are likely to place higher value for the foreign 
earnings of the firms of which subsidiaries are predominantly located to countries where 
protection of investors‟ rights or rule of law is higher. Second, much of both statistical and 
economic significance of the coefficient of foreign earnings in the value relevance regression 
models is associated with the presence of subsidiaries in countries with strong rule of law, which 
we can infer after observing the loss of economic and statistical significance of the individual 
term  once the interaction term between  and RULEQ has been introduced in the 
model.  
 Furthering of our investigation how country-level regulation play role in strengthening 
the value of relevance of earnings, we construct a dummy variable HIGH RULEQ as equal to 
one if the industry-year quintile ranking of RULE OF LAW is above the median of ranking, 
otherwise zero. In column (3) of table 5, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term 
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between  and HIGH RULEQ is positive and highly significant, which also show a 
considerable increase in magnitude of the relationship between foreign earnings and market 
returns. Observing results from table 5 we can conclude that average rule of law of the 
subsidiaries locations does matter in improving the value relevance of foreign earnings, which is 
more evident for the firms that have subsidiaries located in countries with above median ranking 
for rule of law. 
 For a further understanding how regulatory strength in countries in which U.S. 
subsidiaries are located affects value relevance of earnings, we split the sample into two groups 
based on the strength of regulatory regimes and examine whether the value relevance 
significantly varies across the groups. In table 6, we can observe that value relevance of the 
change in foreign earnings for the subsample of MNCs in high rule of law countries, defined by 
HIGH RULEQ equals one, is 0.93, whereas the value relevance of foreign earnings for MNCs in 
low rule of countries is 0.28. The difference between these two coefficients are 0.65, which is 
significant at 1% level.  
 Next we examine how geographic expansion of MNCs after their value relevance and 
whether the effect has any moderating effect through rule of laws of subsidiary destinations. In 
column (2) table 7, we can observe that the coefficient of interaction between NCOUNTRIES, the 
number of countries the MNC is operating in, and change in foreign earnings is negative. But 
when we interact the quintile ranking of rule of law with this interaction term, as the coefficient 
shown in column (2) is 0.012, which is positive and significant. Similarly we can observe a 
positive coefficient for interaction between changes in foreign earnings, NCOUNTRIES and 
HIGH RULEQ. Overall the results indicate that even though geographic expansion might be 
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associated with loss of value relevance of foreign earnings, expanding operations in high rule of 
law countries help MNCs receive increased level of value relevance.  
 A country can have high rule of law and also be tax haven, whereas locating subsidiaries 
in tax haven destination can be an instrument of avoiding regulatory restrictions in home 
country. Thus we further check the value relevance for MNCs with subsidiaries in tax haven 
destination. In table 8, we can observe for the subsample MNCs that have subsidiaries in high 
rule of law countries but have low tax haven intensity, the value relevance of foreign earnings is 
1.274. But the value relevance decreases to 0.463 when the subsidiary destinations belong to 
both characteristics of strong rule of law and high haven intensity. On the other hand, for the 
subsample of MNCs that do not have subsidiaries belonging to high rule of law countries, show 
low value relevance of foreign earnings, whether destinations have high tax haven intensity or 
not. 
 6. Robustness checks 
 In this section we examine whether our results are robust to alternative specifications and 
to the concern of endogeneity arising from the concern of nonrandom decision of locating 
subsidiaries in different foreign region with different strength of rule of law. A detail discussion 
of these issues are as follows. 
 
6.1. Controlling for other important factors 
 We can think of some important factors that could potentially affect the value relevance 
of foreign earnings. For example, investors might pay more attention and highly rely on earnings 
disclosed by large firms. Also foreign earnings could become more relevant for a firm with a 
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large share of revenue generated from foreign subsidiaries. Nonetheless, a high growth in foreign 
revenue might show the importance of foreign operations and lead to a greater market 
appreciation of foreign earnings. Thus next we examine our value relevance model controlling 
for size, foreign share of revenue and foreign sales growth. 
 The results are presented in table 9.  Both column (1) and column (2) show that increase 
in size improves pricing of foreign earnings. More importantly, we find that interaction between 
 and RULEQ is highly significant, which implies our findings are robust to controlling for 
other important variables. Again, multinationals experience the strongest value relevance of 
foreign earnings when they have international subsidiaries placing at upper quintile ranking of 
rule of law, as highly economic and statistical significance of the coefficient of  and 
HIGH RULEQ suggest.  
 
6.2. Earnings quality and value relevance of foreign earnings 
 Rule of law of countries in which a multinational have foreign subsidiaries can influence 
its earnings management practices. For example, using a sample of EU-based multinational 
firms, Beuselinck et al. (2016) show that poor quality of institutional regulation in subsidiary-
countries might lead a higher earnings management at subsidiary-level. Dyreng et al. (2012) 
examine a sample of U.S.-based multinationals for the period of 1994 to 2009 and find that 
discretionary accruals are higher for the companies that have foreign subsidiaries highly 
concentrated in countries with weak rule of law. Findings of this line research might raise the 
concern of the influence of earnings management of multinationals on value relevance of foreign 
earnings. In other words, one can claim that our findings might be due to less earnings 
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management associated with strong rule of law in foreign subsidiary locations, not because of 
rule of law itself. 
 We argue that rule of law has its own characteristics, before its influence reaching to the 
policy level of a firm, which can lead to affecting the pricing of foreign earnings. Empirically it 
suggests that whether earnings management practices of a firm is high or low, more 
concentration of foreign-subsidiaries in the region of high rule of law would likely to increase 
value relevance of foreign earnings. Therefore, to check further validity of our results, we 
construct two subsamples based on earnings management and examine whether our results hold 
regardless of earnings quality. First we calculate absolute value discretionary accruals base on 
modified Jones model (Jones, 1991). Then we construct quintile ranking of discretionary 
accruals for each industry-year and create a subsample of “High earnings management” 
consisting of observations with above median rank. Then rest of the observations is defined 
under the subsample of “Low earnings management”.  
 The results in column (1) and (2) of table 10 show that subsidiaries located to strong rule 
of law destinations help multinationals receive high value relevance of foreign earnings, even if 
the overall earnings quality is low. Similar results we find when earnings quality is high or 
earnings manipulation is low. Overall our findings suggest that no matter whether there is a more 
or less practices of earnings management, strong rule of law associated with foreign subsidiaries 
lead to a greater pricing of foreign earnings. 
 
6.3. Controlling for endogeneity 
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 Given that managers are motivated in maximizing the shareholder value, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that decision of locating subsidiaries in strong rule of law region is not 
random. This could make the relationship between value relevance of foreign earnings and 
subsidiary location choices endogenous. We confront this issue with two approaches – Heckman 
self-selection model (1979), and instrument variable approach. 
 For Heckman self-selection model, we first estimate the probability of a multinational‟s 
subsidiaries concentrated in strong rule of law region based on a probit model. Specifically using 
HIGH RULEQ as the dependent variable, we include some important variables that could 
potentially affect the possibility that the value of the dummy variable, HIGH RULEQ, to be one. 
We follow the logical spirit of Campa and Kedia (2002) in construction of two key variables that 
we employ in our probit model. Essentially in estimating the probability of a firm to be 
industrially diversified, two variables presented by Campa and Kedia (2002) are - fraction of all 
firms in the industry as diversified and fraction of sales in the industry generated by diversified 
firms. Following their argument, these variables should capture industry attractiveness for a firm 
to be diversified. Since our sample consists of internationally diversified firms and we focus on 
high concentration of foreign subsidiaries in countries with strong rule of law in examining the 
value relevance of foreign earnings, we could think of variables that could well capture the 
economic preference for the multinationals to place their subsidiaries in those countries. One 
variable we propose in this paper is the fraction of all subsidiaries in the industry that are in a 
particular country. To construct this variable, first, we calculate share of total subsidiaries in an 
industry for each country and then we distribute those fractions across the subsidiary-countries of 
a firm. Finally, we define EW_COUNTRIES_IND as the equally weighted average of those 
distributed fractions within a firm, where weight is the firm-level proportion of subsidiaries in a 
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country. For example, a firm operating in apparel industry has subsidiaries in Germany, Brazil, 
and France, whereas fraction of subsidiaries in that industry in those countries are 0.15, 0.33, and 
0.09, respectively. Then EW_COUNTRIES_IND for that firm is – 
    
We predict that EW_COUNTRIES_IND should be strongly and positively related with the 
likelihood of the firms in the group of HIGH RULEQ.  
Another variable we propose is EW_COUNTRIES_DIST, which is the equally weighted average 
of distances of foreign subsidiaries from the corresponding capital cities to the capital city of 
U.S. We predict that there should be a strong negative relation between EW_COUNTRIES_DIST 
and probability of HIGH RULEQ to be one. Other factors capturing important firm 
characteristics that we include in our probit specifications are firm size, share of foreign revenue, 
growth in foreign revenue, investment, leverage, and liquidity.   
 
The specification for our probit model is as follows – 
 
(2) 
 
 The results in table 11 show that EW_COUNTRIES_DIST is significantly and positively 
related with the dummy variable HIGH RULEQ. Also as we expect, EW_COUNTRIES_DIST is 
significantly and negatively associated with our binary dependent variable. Other important 
variable that significantly influence the likelihood of a multinational to have subsidiaries 
`25 
 
concentrated in high rule of law destinations are size, growth in foreign revenue, and leverage, 
and liquidity.  
 Following the methodology of Heckman (1979), we calculate Lambda using equation (2) 
to control for endogenetiy. Following the results in table 12 in column (1), after controlling for 
endogeneity in our original model, we find that the coefficient of interaction between ∆FEPS and 
HIGH RULEQ is still positive and highly significant. Another important issue to note that the 
coefficient of Lambda is negative but not significant, which implies that our results are not 
potentially driven by endogenous relationship. 
 Further, following Campa and Kedia (2002), we employ an alternative approach to deal 
with the issue of endogeneity. First, using equation (2) we calculate the predicted probability for 
a multinational to be in the upper quintile ranking as a generated instrument. Essentially in the 
first stage, in a regression with HIGH RULEQ as dependent variable, we use all exogenous 
variables in our original model and also include the predicted probability calculated from 
equation (2). Then we use the fitted value from first stage as an instrument for HIGH RULEQ. 
The results in column (2) of table 12 show that our finding are also robust to this instrumental 
variable approach. The coefficient of interaction between ∆FEPS and HIGH RULEQ suggests 
that higher concentration of foreign subsidiaries in strong rule of law destinations significantly 
increase the value relevance of foreign earnings.     
 
7. Conclusion 
 Literature shows conflicting results on the valuation impact of international 
diversification. There are some papers which show that foreign earnings are more value relevant 
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than domestic earnings, which is mainly because of higher growth opportunities associated with 
foreign operations. We can hardly find any work that focuses on the value relevance of country 
specific characteristics associated with the location of foreign subsidiaries. In this paper, we 
address this gap in the literature and examine how country factors associated with foreign 
subsidiaries, such as strength of investor protection, tax haven could affect the value relevance of 
both consolidated earnings and foreign earnings. We find that operations in high rule of law 
countries help the MNCs to receive high value relevance of foreign earnings. Our results provide 
important implications for investors and regulators who are concerned about reliability of 
earnings disclosed by multinational firms.  
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Image 1: Sample distribution of foreign subsidiaries of U.S incorporated MNCs around the world 
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Table 1: Subsidiary distribution and regulatory characteristics by country 
 
The table shows the country-wise distribution of 165,140 subsidiary-years for the sample period of 1996-2013 and the 
corresponding countries‟ values of rule of law and tax haven status. Rule is the average rule of law scores for each country 
over the sample period, whereas the scores of rule of law for each country is collected from World Bank Governance 
Indicators. Tax haven is a dummy variable equal to one if a country is identified as tax haven following the description of 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009).  
Country Subsidiary 
percentage 
Rule Tax 
haven 
Country Subsidiary 
percentage 
Rule Tax 
haven 
Afghanistan 0.002% -1.776 0 Cuba 0.013% -0.872 0 
Albania 0.012% -0.579 0 Cyprus 0.248% 1.054 1 
Algeria 0.068% -0.794 0 Czech Republic 0.977% 0.871 0 
Angola 0.058% -1.300 0 Denmark 1.267% 1.905 0 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.002% 0.946 1 Djibouti 0.003% -0.738 0 
Argentina 1.372% -0.557 0 Dominica 0.005% 0.658 1 
Armenia 0.022% -0.397 0 Dominican Republic 0.167% -0.650 0 
Aruba 0.025% 1.206 1 Ecuador 0.309% -0.936 0 
Australia 3.170% 1.745 0 Egypt 0.300% -0.163 0 
Austria 1.358% 1.850 0 El Salvador 0.167% -0.694 0 
Azerbaijan 0.016% -0.819 0 Equatorial Guinea 0.028% -1.295 0 
Bahamas, The 0.160% 1.062 1 Eritrea 0.001% -0.346 0 
Bahrain 0.087% 0.449 1 Estonia 0.112% 1.011 0 
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Bangladesh 0.057% -0.870 0 Ethiopia 0.007% -0.662 0 
Barbados 0.975% 1.235 1 Fiji 0.010% -0.349 0 
Belarus 0.016% -0.989 0 Finland 0.953% 1.940 0 
Belgium 1.982% 1.311 0 France 3.981% 1.409 0 
Belize 0.008% -0.265 1 French Guiana 0.001% 0.927 0 
Benin 0.002% -0.569 0 Congo 0.001% -1.638 0 
Bermuda 1.049% 1.066 1 Costa Rica 0.418% 0.500 1 
Bolivia 0.142% -0.760 0 Cote d'Ivoire 0.015% -1.116 0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0.017% -0.359 0 Croatia 0.130% 0.035 0 
Botswana 0.067% 0.616 0 Gabon 0.044% -0.481 0 
Brazil 2.393% -0.275 0 Gaza Strip 0.001% -0.440 0 
Brunei 0.037% 0.552 0 Georgia 0.574% -0.645 0 
Bulgaria 0.170% -0.149 0 Germany 4.071% 1.642 0 
Burkina Faso 0.009% -0.415 0 Ghana 0.067% -0.063 0 
Burma 0.005% -1.472 0 Greece 0.411% 0.736 0 
Cambodia 0.013% -1.069 0 Grenada 0.007% 0.305 1 
Cameroon 0.025% -1.106 0 Guam 0.033% 1.123 0 
Canada 4.839% 1.735 0 Guatemala 0.245% -1.074 0 
Cayman Islands 1.249% 1.101 1 Guinea 0.050% -1.369 0 
Chad 0.013% -1.448 0 Haiti 0.004% -1.370 0 
Country Subsidiary 
percentage 
Rule Tax 
haven 
Country Subsidiary 
percentage 
Mean 
rule of 
law 
Tax 
haven 
Chile 0.928% 1.265 0 Honduras 0.159% -0.969 0 
China 3.128% -0.421 0 Hong Kong 2.779% 1.388 1 
Colombia 0.755% -0.584 0 Hungary 1.008% 0.814 0 
Iceland 0.033% 1.791 0 Monaco 0.028% 0.900 1 
India 2.333% 0.042 0 Mongolia 0.011% -0.339 0 
Indonesia 0.681% -0.684 0 Morocco 0.141% -0.126 0 
Iran 0.016% -0.787 0 Namibia 0.024% 0.191 0 
Iraq 0.017% -1.558 0 Nepal 0.001% -0.405 0 
Ireland 1.913% 1.646 1 Netherlands 3.578% 1.760 0 
Israel 0.893% 0.922 0 Netherlands Antilles 0.093% 0.871 1 
Italy 2.791% 0.543 0 New Zealand 1.241% 1.849 0 
Jamaica 0.163% -0.432 0 Nicaragua 0.096% -0.756 0 
Japan 3.214% 1.296 0 Niger 0.002% -0.596 0 
Jersey 0.033% 1.719 1 Nigeria 0.233% -1.202 0 
Jordan 0.028% 0.351 0 Norway 1.061% 1.913 0 
Kazakhstan 0.070% -0.775 0 Oman 0.048% 0.573 0 
Kenya 0.114% -0.937 0 Pakistan 0.148% -0.840 0 
Kiribati 0.004% 0.400 0 Palau 0.002% 0.852 0 
Korea, South 1.991% 0.909 0 Panama 0.395% -0.162 1 
Kosovo 0.004% -0.732 0 Papua New Guinea 0.021% -0.911 0 
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Kuwait 0.036% 0.567 0 Paraguay 0.056% -0.977 0 
Kyrgyzstan 0.008% -1.121 0 Peru 0.543% -0.645 0 
Laos 0.001% -1.096 0 Philippines 0.870% -0.437 0 
Latvia 0.090% 0.619 0 Poland 1.235% 0.591 0 
Lebanon 0.064% -0.512 1 Portugal 0.854% 1.112 0 
Lesotho 0.015% -0.271 0 Puerto Rico 0.773% 0.766 0 
Liberia 0.047% -1.431 1 Qatar 0.054% 0.789 0 
Libya 0.041% -0.994 0 Reunion 0.007% 1.008 0 
Liechtenstein 0.029% 1.369 1 Romania 0.340% -0.039 0 
Lithuania 0.091% 0.599 0 Russia 0.767% -0.865 0 
Luxembourg 1.120% 1.795 1 Rwanda 0.001% -0.205 0 
Macau 0.082% 0.615 1 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.032% 0.716 1 
Macedonia 0.025% -0.334 0 Saint Lucia 0.032% 0.755 1 
Madagascar 0.005% -0.759 0 Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
0.018% 0.762 1 
Malawi 0.025% -0.212 0 Samoa 0.012% 0.803 1 
Malaysia 1.530% 0.489 1 San Marino 0.002% 0.806 1 
Mali 0.018% -0.377 0 Saudi Arabia 0.224% 0.182 0 
Malta 0.091% 1.414 1 Senegal 0.024% -0.283 0 
Marshall Islands 0.012% -0.012 1 Serbia 0.086% -0.469 0 
Country Subsidiary 
percentage 
Rule Tax 
haven 
Country Subsidiary 
percentage 
Mean 
rule of 
law 
Tax 
haven 
Martinique 0.001% 0.874 0 Slovakia 0.383% 0.456 0 
Mauritania 0.003% -0.867 0 Slovenia 0.117% 0.981 0 
Mauritius 0.592% 0.938 1     
Mexico 3.180% -0.533 0     
Moldova 0.020% -0.432 0     
South Africa 1.189% 0.095 0     
Spain 2.410% 1.184 0     
Sri Lanka 0.049% 0.096 0     
Sudan 0.002% -1.370 0     
Suriname 0.019% -0.203 0     
Swaziland 0.012% -0.578 0     
Sweden 1.877% 1.869 0     
Switzerland 2.156% 1.845 1     
Syria 0.005% -0.646 0     
Taiwan 1.387% 0.894 0     
Tanzania 0.050% -0.444 0     
Thailand 1.310% 0.060 0     
Timor-Leste 0.010% -1.130 0     
Trinidad and Tobago 0.140% -0.091 0     
Tunisia 0.096% 0.028 0     
Turkey 0.621% 0.042 0     
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Turkmenistan 0.002% -1.507 0     
Tuvalu 0.004% 1.153 0     
Uganda 0.033% -0.422 0     
Ukraine 0.180% -0.824 0     
United Arab Emirates 0.255% 0.517 0     
United Kingdom 4.580% 1.673 0     
United States of 
America 
1.076% 1.560 0     
Uruguay 0.362% 0.542 0     
Uzbekistan 0.012% -1.239 0     
Vanuatu 0.024% 0.182 1     
Venezuela 0.859% -1.315 0     
Vietnam 0.176% -0.455 0     
Virgin Islands (US) 0.025% 0.990 0     
Wake Island 0.016% -1.152 0     
Yemen 0.031% -1.252 0     
Zambia 0.058% -0.486 0     
Zimbabwe 0.084% -1.457 0     
 
 
Table 2: Subsidiary distribution and earnings share by industry 
The table shows the industry-wise distribution of 165,140 subsidiary-years for the sample period of 1996-2013 and 
the corresponding values of rule of law and tax haven status. Rule is the average rule of law scores for each country 
over the sample period, whereas the scores of rule of law for each country is collected from World Bank 
Governance Indicators. Tax haven is a dummy variable equal to one if a country is identified as tax haven following 
the description of Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). Haven intensity is the total number of tax haven countries divided by 
the total number of counties in which a firm has material operations. Domestic (Foreign) earnings share show the 
average percentages of total annual income in an industry are from domestic (foreign) sources. DOMESTIC 
EARNINGS are defined as the difference between pretax domestic income and domestic taxes; whereas domestic 
taxes are the difference between total income taxes and foreign taxes. FOREIGN EARNINGS are the difference 
between pretax domestic income and foreign taxes; whereas foreign taxes are the sum of foreign income taxes and 
deferred foreign taxes. Industries are defined following Fama-French 48 industry classifications. 
Industry Subsidiary 
percentage 
Rule of 
law 
Haven intensity Domestic 
earnings 
share 
Foreign 
earnings 
share 
Agriculture 0.315% 0.805 21.154% 55.056% 44.944% 
Aircraft 0.560% 1.097 17.857% 50.936% 49.064% 
Apparel 1.387% 1.059 21.616% 32.169% 67.831% 
Automobiles and trucks 2.966% 0.815 12.209% 62.128% 37.872% 
Beer 0.585% 0.707 17.081% 35.978% 64.022% 
Business services 18.337% 0.985 17.579% 43.860% 56.140% 
Business supplies 2.312% 0.872 16.160% 48.951% 51.049% 
Candy & soda 0.108% 0.693 20.225% 30.145% 69.855% 
Chemicals 6.736% 0.776 17.332% 40.433% 59.567% 
Coal 0.019% 1.125 19.355% 79.811% 20.189% 
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Communication 1.054% 0.821 18.438% 0.000% 100.000% 
Computers 7.113% 0.928 20.124% 21.662% 78.338% 
Construction 0.532% 0.995 24.915% 54.838% 45.162% 
Construction materials 2.129% 0.992 17.975% 51.924% 48.076% 
Consumer goods 2.805% 0.795 17.267% 34.658% 65.342% 
Electrical equipment 2.569% 0.828 16.663% 46.200% 53.800% 
Electronic equipment 8.202% 1.002 23.691% 31.747% 68.253% 
Entertainment 0.276% 0.806 19.560% 0.000% 100.000% 
Fabricated products 0.231% 0.922 14.173% 0.000% 100.000% 
Food products 2.077% 0.644 15.219% 58.535% 41.465% 
Gold 0.150% 0.42 14.919% 100.000% 0.000% 
Guns 0.015% 1.312 36.000% 95.153% 4.847% 
Healthcare 0.146% 1.142 18.257% 98.252% 1.748% 
Machinery 9.194% 0.892 17.533% 46.347% 53.653% 
Measuring and Control Equipment 3.716% 1.085 18.872% 39.842% 60.158% 
Medical equipment 4.382% 1.084 17.302% 18.083% 81.917% 
Metallic and industrial metal mining 0.248% 0.739 12.195% 0.000% 100.000% 
Other 0.973% 0.926 17.808% 54.696% 45.304% 
Personal services 0.869% 1.026 22.787% 67.525% 32.475% 
Industry Subsidiary 
percentage 
Rule of 
law 
Haven intensity 
share 
Domestic 
earnings 
share 
Foreign 
earnings 
share 
Petroleum and natural gas 2.815% 0.444 22.633% 30.820% 69.180% 
Pharmaceutical products 4.967% 0.896 16.411% 26.512% 73.488% 
Printing and publishing 0.750% 0.962 17.932% 88.516% 11.484% 
Recreation 0.832% 1.132 19.869% 12.893% 87.107% 
Restaurants, hotels, motels 0.351% 1.046 24.138% 39.210% 60.790% 
Retail 1.444% 1.057 24.119% 77.788% 22.212% 
Rubber and Plastic Products 1.482% 0.753 15.727% 24.990% 75.010% 
Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 0.134% 0.848 12.613% 80.413% 19.587% 
Shipping containers 0.627% 0.751 14.865% 57.055% 42.945% 
Steel 1.375% 0.821 16.520% 28.050% 71.950% 
Textiles 0.586% 0.883 17.872% 0.000% 100.000% 
Tobacco products 0.276% 0.635 15.132% 51.153% 48.847% 
Transportation 0.808% 0.826 21.049% 12.465% 87.535% 
Utilities 0.056% 0.694 24.731% 86.659% 13.341% 
Wholesale 3.492% 0.881 17.725% 55.070% 44.930% 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
The table show the descriptive statistics of key characteristics of the sample of U.S. multinational firms for the period of 1996-2013. LOW RULEQ (HIGH 
RULEQ) is the subsample below (above) the median of quintile ranking of the scores of rule of law for the firm-years. Rule of law scores for each country-
year is collected from World Bank Governance Indicators and a firm‟s rule of law scores are the average scores across the countries in which the firms has 
material operations. Return is compounded monthly market adjusted returns from the fourth month of current fiscal year to the third month after the end of 
fiscal year. TOTAL ASSETS is the total assets of the firm in million dollars; MVE is market value of equity; Total Earnings is firms‟ earnings in million 
dollars. FOREIGN EARNINGS are the difference between pretax foreign income and foreign taxes; whereas foreign taxes are the sum of foreign income taxes 
and deferred foreign taxes. DOMESTIC EARNINGS are defined as the difference between pretax domestic income and domestic taxes; whereas domestic 
taxes are the difference between total income taxes and foreign taxes. PRICE is the market price of stock. BVPS is the book value per share calculated as book 
value of equity divided by total number of shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year. EPS is earnings per share calculated as income before extraordinary 
items divided by total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. ∆EPS is the change in total earnings per share deflated by stock price at the 
end of previous fiscal year. ∆FEPS (∆DEPS) is the change in foreign (domestic) earnings per share deflated by stock price at the end of previous fiscal year. 
NCOUNTRIES is the number of distinct countries in which the firms have subsidiaries. HAVEN INTENSITY is the total number of tax haven countries divided 
by the total number of counties in which a firm has material operations.  
 Whole Sample LOW RULEQ HIGH RULEQ Differences 
Variable Mean 
(1) 
Median 
(2) 
Mean 
(3) 
Median 
(4) 
Mean 
(5) 
Median 
(6) 
Mean 
(3)-(5) 
Median 
(4)-(6) 
Return 0.034 -0.013 0.033 -0.010 0.036 -0.018 -0.003 0.007 
TOTAL ASSETS 5602.590 979.895 6303.930 1304.020 4548.000 643.311 1755.930*** 660.710*** 
MVE 6857.200 1040.480 7904.420 1379.890 5282.520 711.884 2621.900*** 668.006*** 
TOTAL EARNINGS 322.177 36.287 373.674 50.065 244.742 22.979 128.932*** 27.086*** 
FOREIGN EARNINGS 186.348 11.630 230.410 18.840 120.094 5.547 110.316*** 13.294*** 
DOMESTIC 
EARNINGS 
145.406 15.931 150.285 20.316 138.071 10.584 12.214 9.732*** 
PRICE 30.216 22.250 32.149 24.035 27.309 19.380 4.840*** 4.655*** 
BVPS 11.932 9.175 12.545 9.646 11.009 8.455 1.536*** 1.191*** 
EPS 1.004 0.961 1.017 1.090 0.984 0.777 0.033 0.313*** 
∆EPS 0.041 0.004 0.061 0.004 0.011 0.004 0.050 0.000 
∆ ∆DEPS 0.037 0.001 0.056 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.047 0.000 
 ∆FEPS 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004* 0.000 
NCOUNTRIES 13.439 9.000 17.262 13.000 7.691 6.000 9.571*** 7.000*** 
HAVEN INTENSTIY 0.190 0.167 0.179 0.167 0.206 0.172 -0.026*** -0.006** 
N 12,288 7,380 4,908   
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Table 4: Correlation coefficients 
The table shows Pearson correlations between the key characteristics of the firms and information of international subsidiaries. Return is compounded monthly 
market adjusted returns from the fourth month of current fiscal year to the third month after the end of fiscal year. RULE is the firms‟ average rule of law scores 
across the countries in which the firms have material operations, whereas rule of law scores for each country-year is obtained from World Bank Governance 
Indicators.  EPS is earnings per share calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by total number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. 
DEPS (FEPS) is the domestic (foreign) earnings per share. ∆EPS is the change in total earnings per share deflated by stock price at the end of previous fiscal year. 
∆FEPS (∆DEPS) is the change in foreign (domestic) earnings per share deflated by stock price at the end of previous fiscal year. NCOUNTRIES is the number of 
distinct countries in which the firms have subsidiaries. HAVEN INTENSITY is the total number of tax haven countries divided by the total number of counties in 
which a firm has material operations. 
 Return RULE EPS DEPS FEPS ∆EPS ∆DEPS ∆FEPS NCOUNTRIES HAVEN 
INTENSTIY 
Return 1          
RULE -0.010 1         
EPS 0.019** -0.015* 1        
DEPS 0.027*** -0.024*** 0.116*** 1       
FEPS 0.010 -0.079*** 0.045*** 0.406*** 1      
 ∆EPS 0.014 -0.001 0.533*** 0.038*** 0.000 1     
      ∆DEPS 0.013 -0.001 0.534*** 0.038*** -0.001 1.000 1    
∆FEPS 0.112*** -0.024*** -0.010 -0.006 0.020** -0.017* -0.028*** 1   
NCOUNTRIES 0.006 -0.303*** 0.031*** 0.099*** 0.195*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 1  
HAVEN 
INTENSTIY 
-0.002 0.098*** 0.016* 0.007 0.057*** -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.037*** 1 
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Table 5: Quality of regulatory regimes and returns-earnings association 
The table shows the relationship between stock return and earnings of multinational firms with subsidiaries in 
different regulatory regimes. The dependent variable is RETURNS, which is compounded monthly market adjusted 
returns from the fourth month of current fiscal year to the third month after the end of fiscal year. ∆DEPS (∆FEPS) 
is the changes in after-tax domestic (foreign) earnings per share deflated by stock price at the end of previous year. 
RULEQ is the industry-year quintile ranking of average rules of law score of the firms. Rules of law scores for each 
country for each year is obtained from World Bank Governance Indicators and a firm‟s rule of law scores are the 
average scores across the countries in which the firms has material operations. HIGH RULEQ is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the observations are above the median of quintile ranking of the scores of rule of law for the firm-
years. Each regression model control for both industry and year effects. Industries are defined following Fama-
French 48 industry classifications. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
Indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.058*** 
(0.015) 
-0.058*** 
(0.017) 
-0.058*** 
(0.015) 
∆DEPS 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
∆FEPS 0.376*** 
(0.065) 
0.033 
(0.091) 
0.279*** 
(0.058) 
RULEQ  0.000 
(0.003) 
 
∆FEPS *RULEQ  0.158*** 
(0.044) 
 
HIGH  RULEQ   0.002 
(0.008) 
∆FEPS *HIGH RULEQ 
 
  0.590*** 
(0.159) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.074 0.077 0.078 
N 12,288 12,288 12,288 
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Table 6: Returns-earnings associations for different subsamples of MNCs with exposure to 
different regulatory regimes 
The table reports results from industry and year fixed effects of regressions of returns on the changes in domestic 
and foreign earnings for the subsample of firms based on quality of regulatory regimes in which the international 
subsidiaries are located. The dependent variable is RETURNS, which is compounded monthly market adjusted 
returns from the fourth month of current fiscal year to the third month after the end of fiscal year. ∆DEPS (∆FEPS) 
is the changes in after-tax domestic (foreign) earnings per share deflated by stock price at the end of previous year. 
HIGH RULEQ is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm‟s scores of rules of law averaged across the scores 
associated with countries in which its subsidiaries are located are above the median of quintile ranking of scores in a 
year. Quintile rankings are constructed for the firms by industry-year. Industries are defined following Fama-French 
48 industry classifications. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** Indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Subsamples ∆DEPS 
(1) 
∆FEPS 
(2) 
Differences 
(1) - (2) 
Adjusted R
2
 N 
(a) HIGH RULEQ=1 0.182*** 
(0.061) 
0.927*** 
(0.158) 
-0.744*** 
(17.550) 
 
0.105 4,908 
(b) HIGH RULEQ=0 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.280*** 
(0.058) 
-0.279*** 
(23.720) 
 
0.071 7,380 
Differences  
(a) – (b) 
0.182*** 
 
0.647*** 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 7: Returns-earnings association and the extent of geographic diversification and the qualities 
of regulations 
The table reports results from industry and year fixed effects regressions showing returns-earnings association with 
respect to the number of countries the firms have material operations and the exposure to different regulatory 
regimes. The dependent variable is RETURNS, which is compounded monthly market adjusted returns from the 
fourth month of current fiscal year to the third month after the end of fiscal year. ∆DEPS (∆FEPS) is the changes in 
after-tax domestic (foreign) earnings per share deflated by stock price at the end of previous year. NCOUNTRIES is 
the number of distinct countries in which the firms have subsidiaries. RULEQ is the industry-year quintile ranking of 
average rules of law score of the firms. Rules of law scores for each country for each year is obtained from World 
Bank Governance Indicators and a firm‟s rule of law scores are the average scores across the countries in which the 
firms has material operations. HIGH RULEQ is a dummy variable equal to one if the observations are above the 
median of quintile ranking of the scores of rule of law for the firm-years. Industries are defined following Fama-
French 48 industry classifications. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
Indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.056*** 
(0.015) 
-0.054*** 
(0.019) 
-0.056*** 
(0.016) 
∆DEPS 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
∆FEPS 0.329*** 
(0.072) 
0.309*** 
(0.064) 
0.305 
(0.067) 
NCOUNTRIES 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
RULEQ  0.000 
(0.003) 
 
HIGH RULEQ   0.001 
(0.008) 
∆FEPS *NCOUNTRIES 0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.018* 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
∆FEPS * NCOUNTRIES *RULEQ  0.012** 
(0.005) 
 
∆FEPS * NCOUNTRIES *HIGH RULEQ   0.031** 
(0.016) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.074 0.076 0.075 
N 12,288 12,288 12,288 
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Table 8: Returns-earnings association and exposure to regulatory regimes in tax haven destinations 
The table reports results from industry and year fixed effects of regressions showing association of returns with 
positive or negative changes in foreign and domestic earnings per share for the subsamples of firms with subsidiaries 
in countries with different regulatory regimes. The dependent variable is RETURNS, which is compounded monthly 
market adjusted returns from the fourth month of current fiscal year to the third month after the end of fiscal year. 
∆DEPS (∆FEPS) is the changes in after-tax domestic (foreign) earnings per share deflated by stock price at the end 
of previous year. HIGH RULEQ is a dummy variable equal to one if the observations are above the median of 
quintile ranking of the scores of rule of law for the firm-years. HIGH HAVENQ is a dummy variable equal to one if 
a firm is above the industry-year quintile rankings of HAVEN INTENSITY of the firms. HAVEN INTENSITY is the 
total number of tax haven countries divided by the total number of counties in which a firm has material operations. 
Subsamples ∆DEPS ∆FEPS Adjusted R2 N 
(a) HIGH RULEQ=1, HIGH 
HAVENQ=0 
0.157*** 
(0.050) 
1.274*** 
(0.2430 
0.114 2,755 
(b) HIGH RULEQ=1, HIGH 
HAVENQ=1 
0.371*** 
(0.093) 
0.463*** 
(0.161) 
0.110 2,153 
Differences 
(a) – (b) 
-0.214** 0.811***   
(c)HIGH RULEQ=0, HIGH 
HAVENQ=0 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.281*** 
(0.071) 
0.081 4,667 
(d) HIGH RULEQ=0, HIGH 
HAVENQ=1 
0.119*** 
(0.042) 
0.283*** 
(0.100) 
0.068 2,713 
Differences 
(c) - (d) 
-0.118*** -0.002   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Controlling for other important factors 
This table reports results from industry and year fixed effects regressions showing the value relevance of foreign 
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earnings with respect to strength of rule of law across countries where U.S. multinationals have subsidiaries. The 
dependent variable is RETURNS, which is compounded monthly market adjusted returns from the fourth month of 
current fiscal year to the third month after the end of fiscal year. ∆DEPS (∆FEPS) is the changes in after-tax 
domestic (foreign) earnings per share deflated by stock price at the end of previous year. RULEQ is the industry-
year quintile ranking of average rules of law score of the firms. Rules of law scores for each country for each year is 
obtained from World Bank Governance Indicators and a firm‟s rule of law scores are the average scores across the 
countries in which the firms has material operations. HIGH RULEQ is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
observations are above the median of quintile ranking of the scores of rule of law for the firm-years. Other control 
variables are SIZE as natural logarithm of total assets, FSAHRE as foreign share of total revenue, and FREV 
GROWTH as growth in foreign revenue. Industries are defined following Fama-French 48 industry classifications. 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
Intercept -0.067** -0.066*** 
 (0.027) (0.025) 
∆DEPS 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
∆FEPS -0.190 -0.037 
 (0.207) (0.224) 
RULEQ 0.001  
 (0.003)  
HIGH RULEQ  0.002 
  (0.008) 
SIZE 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
FSHARE -0.036* -0.035* 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
FREV GROWTH -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
∆FEPS *RULEQ 0.179***  
 (0.055)  
∆FEPS *HIGH RULEQ  0.609*** 
  (0.178) 
∆FEPS *SIZE 0.051 0.067** 
 (0.035) (0.031) 
∆FEPS *FSHARE -0.122 -0.047 
 (0.169) (0.143) 
∆FEPS *FREV GROWTH 0.003 0.035 
 (0.076) (0.072) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0802 0.0801 
N 10,984 10,984 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Potential influence of earnings quality 
This table reports results from industry and year fixed effects regressions showing the value relevance of foreign 
earnings with respect to strength of rule of law across countries where U.S. multinationals have subsidiaries. 
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Subsample of “High EM” consists of firm-years above median of industry-year quintile ranking of absolute value of 
discretional accruals, whereas subsample “Low EM” includes observations not in the group of “High EM”. Measure 
of discretionary accruals is calculated following the methodology of modified Jones. The dependent variable is 
RETURNS, which is compounded monthly market adjusted returns from the fourth month of current fiscal year to 
the third month after the end of fiscal year. ∆DEPS (∆FEPS) is the changes in after-tax domestic (foreign) earnings 
per share deflated by stock price at the end of previous year. RULEQ is the industry-year quintile ranking of average 
rules of law score of the firms. Rules of law scores for each country for each year is obtained from World Bank 
Governance Indicators and a firm‟s rule of law scores are the average scores across the countries in which the firms 
has material operations. HIGH RULEQ is a dummy variable equal to one if the observations are above the median of 
quintile ranking of the scores of rule of law for the firm-years. Other control variables are SIZE as natural logarithm 
of total assets (AT), FSAHRE as foreign share of total revenue, and FREV GROWTH as growth in foreign revenue. 
Industries are defined following Fama-French 48 industry classifications. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 High EM Low EM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -0.059 -0.065 -0.065* -0.065** 
 (0.048) (0.044) (0.035) (0.032) 
∆DEPS 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.031) 
∆FEPS -0.397 -0.005 -0.052 0.110 
 (0.319) (0.278) (0.371) (0.426) 
RULEQ 0.003  -0.002  
 (0.005)  (0.004)  
HIGH RULEQ  0.020  -0.010 
  (0.015)  (0.011) 
SIZE 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
FSHARE -0.045 -0.040 -0.046* -0.046* 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.025) (0.025) 
FREV GROWTH 0.003 0.003 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
∆FEPS *RULEQ 0.194***  0.249**  
 (0.072)  (0.110)  
∆FEPS *HIGH RULEQ  0.632***  0.648** 
  (0.208)  (0.336) 
∆FEPS *SIZE 0.084** 0.055 0.024 0.069 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.056) (0.064) 
∆FEPS *FSHARE -0.411* -0.156 -0.065 -0.048 
 (0.243) (0.176) (0.529) (0.625) 
∆FEPS *FREV GROWTH -0.045 -0.033 0.318* 0.392** 
 (0.103) (0.099) (0.179) (0.196) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0805 0.0809 0.0918 0.0899 
Observations 3,854 3,854 5,862 5,862 
 
 
Table 11: Probability of locating subsidiaries to high rule of law region 
This table shows results of probit estimates of locating foreign subsidiaries in high rule of law region. The dependent 
variable is HIGH RULEQ, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the observations are above the median of 
quintile ranking of the scores of rule of law for the firm-years, whereas industry-year ranking is constructed based 
on average rules of law score of the firms. Rules of law scores for each country for each year is obtained from World 
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Bank Governance Indicators and a firm‟s rule of law scores are the average scores across the countries in which the 
firms has material operations. The variable EW_COUNTRIES_IND is equally weighted average of fraction of all 
subsidiaries in the industry that are located to countries where the firm-year has operations in, whereas weight is 
based on the fraction of total unique number of subsidiary-locations of a firm-year in a specific destination. The 
variable EW_COUNTRIES_DIST is equally weighted average of distances of subsidiaries from their capital cities to 
the capital city of U.S. Other variables are SIZE as natural logarithm of total assets (AT), FSAHRE as foreign share 
of total revenue, FREV GROWTH as growth in foreign revenue, INVESTMENT is the ratio of capital expenditure 
(CAPX) to sales (SALE), LEVERAGE as total debt (DLC+DLTT) divided by total assets, and LIQUIDITY as the 
ratio of total current assets (ACT) to total current liabilities (LCT). Industries are defined following Fama-French 48 
industry classifications. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** Indicate 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 (1) 
Intercept 3.371*** 
 (0.299) 
EW_COUNTRIES_IND 12.876*** 
 (0.872) 
EW_COUNTRIES_DIST -0.418*** 
 (0.034) 
SIZE -0.108*** 
 (0.008) 
FSHARE 0.055 
 (0.058) 
FREV GROWTH 0.028** 
 (0.012) 
INVESTMENT 0.198 
 (0.138) 
LEVERAGE -0.130* 
 (0.071) 
LIQUIDITY 0.034*** 
 (0.007) 
Pseudo R
2
 0.076 
Observations 10,717 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Controlling for endogeneity 
This table reports results of regressions showing value relevance of foreign earnings with respect to foreign 
subsidiaries being located to strong rule of law region, while controlling for endogeneity in the relationship. “Self-
selection” model is following the approach of Heckman (1979), and “Instrumental variable” model is following the 
approach of Campa and Kedia (2002). The dependent variable is RETURNS, which is compounded monthly market 
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adjusted returns from the fourth month of current fiscal year to the third month after the end of fiscal year. ∆DEPS 
(∆FEPS) is the changes in after-tax domestic (foreign) earnings per share deflated by stock price at the end of 
previous year. HIGH RULEQ is a dummy variable equal to one if the observations are above the median of quintile 
ranking of the scores of rule of law for the firm-years, whereas industry-year ranking is constructed based on 
average rules of law score of the firms. Rules of law scores for each country for each year is obtained from World 
Bank Governance Indicators and a firm‟s rule of law scores are the average scores across the countries in which the 
firms has material operations.. Other control variables are SIZE as natural logarithm of total assets (AT), FSAHRE as 
foreign share of total revenue, and FREV GROWTH as growth in foreign revenue. Lambda is the inverse Mill‟s ratio 
calculated from the first stage of Heckman‟s (1979). Industries are defined following Fama-French 48 industry 
classifications. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** Indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  Self-selection 
(1) 
Instrumental variable 
(2) 
Intercept -0.057** -0.159* 
 (0.025) (0.084) 
∆DEPS 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
∆FEPS -0.027 -0.024 
 (0.224) (0.224) 
HIGH RULEQ 0.000 0.021 
 (0.009) (0.031) 
SIZE 0.006 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
FSHARE -0.032 -0.033* 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
FREV GROWTH -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
∆FEPS *HIGH RULEQ 0.611*** 0.604*** 
 (0.178) (0.178) 
∆FEPS *SIZE 0.065** 0.064** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
∆FEPS *FSHARE -0.044 -0.044 
 (0.143) (0.142) 
∆FEPS *FREV GROWTH 0.035 0.034 
 (0.072) (0.072) 
Lambda -0.023  
 (0.025)  
Adjusted R
2
 0.0787 0.0783 
Observations 10,717 10,717 
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